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PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM IV:
IMPLEMENTATION

Comments
FRIEDER ROESSLER*, ANGELA ELLARD**,

AND RICHARD ELLIOTT***

FRIEDER ROESSLER: Roessler disagreed with Reif's conclusion that under the
DSU rules on the suspension of concessions, WTO Members have the option
between performance and compensation (or bearing the consequences of retaliation). He observed that article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
requires the parties to a treaty to perform their obligations and that there is no
provision in the DSU that establishes a different principle. Reif's interpretation
would make those WTO rules that explicitly give the option of compensation
redundant. For instance, tariffs may be renegotiated but not quantitative restriction; under the various federal clauses set out in WTO agreements, Members
need not perform their obligations in respect of measures taken at the sub-federal
level; and the DSU provisions on non-violation nullification and impairment make
explicit that there is no obligation to remove the measure that caused nullification
or impairment. These distinctions would be lost if all obligations under the WTO
were renegotiable.
So far there has been no contracting parties to the GATT or the WTO Members
formally claiming to have the right to maintain a measure found to be illegal.
However, in a number of cases panel recommendations were implemented
through the replacement of illegal measures (such as national-treatment violations
or quantitative import restrictions) by legal measures with equivalent protective

*Until 1995, Frieder Roessler was Director, Legal Affairs Division of the GATT, and then WTO
Secretariat. From 1995-98, he was Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown Law Center.
**Angela Ellard is Trade Counsel to the House Committee on Ways & Means, where she advises
members on a variety of trade matters, including the operation of the trade laws, "fast track"
authority, antidumping and countervailing duty issues, bilateral relationship with various U.S. trading
partners, and World Trade Organization and NAFTA issues.
***Richard Elliott is of counsel to the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison,
residing in their Washington, D.C. office.
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effects (such as tariffs or safeguard actions) after the party that had lost the case
resorted to the GATT procedures for the renegotiation of tariffs or the imposition
of safeguard measures. Under the GATS, all market access and national-treatment
commitments are renegotiable and a WTO Member found to have violated them
can therefore maintain them if it is ready to offer compensation (or bear the
consequences of retaliation) in the context of the GATS renegotiation procedures.
In some cases, the measures found to be illegal were subsequently authorized
through a waiver, as for instance in the case of the preferences accorded under the
Lom6 Convention. Against this background, Roessler expressed doubts whether
there is a political need to introduce a general right to deny performance into
the legal system of the WTO.
ANGELA ELLARD: Ellard commented that the congressional response to implementation of WTO dispute settlement decisions tends to be schizophrenic. Politicians' views on implementation frequently depend on whether their country was
the complaining party or the defending party.
Ellard agreed with the comments of S. Bruce Wilson during the "National
Perspectives" panel that implementation will be a key factor in the Section 125
review by Congress. Members will be focusing on how the United States implemented adverse rulings and how other WTO member countries implemented
rulings that were favorable to the United States. The record of implementation
should be examined with regard to speed and whether countries have chosen
implementation or compensation in lieu of implementation.
Ellard addressed the decision of the WTO panel in the U.S. -Reformulated
Gasoline case. She was surprised that the reaction in Congress was not stronger
than it was. She noted that many reports in the media were misleading because
they stated that the panel's decision required Congress to amend the Clean Air
Act. Ellard described the panel decision as having been well-handled by the
Administration and interested members of Congress. She provided some of the
history of congressional consideration of the issue before the panel issued its
report, noting that Congress originally attached a rider to an appropriations bill
that would have prevented changes to U.S. regulations on reformulated gasoline.
However, after the panel issued its report, the effort to attach a similar rider
was withdrawn, and the Senate instead passed language urging the EPA, in a
transparent process, to adopt regulations that would both implement the WTO
decision and protect the environment. Ultimately, the bill, as signed into law
after a conference with the House, contained no language.
The lesson of U.S. -Reformulated Gasoline is the need for the country implementing a WTO panel decision to manage its domestic constituencies. In this
particular case, all parties concerned were satisfied in the end. However, Ellard
noted that this was a relatively easy case because the United States was not
required to change a statute to be in compliance. Ellard is skeptical as to whether
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the same result would emerge from the dispute over the Helms-Burton Act, should
a negative panel decision result.
Ellard agreed with Reif that in prescribing the length of an implementation
period, WTO panels should not take the implementing country's domestic
politics into account. Giving a country extra time merely because it has a
difficult political situation to manage would make it hard to develop clear,
transparent standards for implementation. It is valid, however, to distinguish
between the burdens of implementing change through statutory amendment
versus implementing change through regulatory amendment in determining
the length of time for implementation.
Finally, Ellard addressed the EU-Bananas and EU-Beef Hormone cases.
Some members of Congress are looking at implementation of these decisions
with great interest. She noted that agriculture had been a major issue in the 1997
debate over whether to renew the President's fast track authority. It is an area
of great concern to the members of Congress. Therefore, the successful implementation of the EU-Bananasand EU-Beef Hormone decisions by the EU will be
critical in Congress' section 125 review in the year 2000.
RICHARD ELLIOTT: Elliott commented that the WTO should be indifferent as
to whether the losing party in a dispute implements a panel's decision or, instead,
pays compensation. The focus of the DSU is satisfying the parties to a dispute.
If compensation satisfies the parties, that is all that should matter. This should
be the case even as to disputes concerning fundamental GATT obligations such
as most-favored-nation obligations. In practice, countries have gone to great
lengths to try to show that they are implementing panel reports.
Fifteen months has developed as the normal time period for implementation
of panel decisions. Fifteen months is the outer limit, not the norm, especially
pursuant to the arbitral decision in the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case. It is
good that the arbitrators in that case did not list a long series of factors that
weighed in their decision. If they had, parties in later cases would assert that
particular factors were present in their cases as well and would insist that they
be given more time for implementation. As it stands, a party must satisfy a very
high threshold of persuasion if it wants to take more than fifteen months to
implement a panel decision and must be prepared to offer compensation.
Elliott argued that greater clarity in panel reports is not the key to improving
the record of implementation. The solution lies in article 21.5 of the DSU
(which concerns returning to the original panel in the event of a dispute over
implementation). He said that the winning parties should be able to invoke
article 21.5 during the implementation process. By six months following a
panel report, the parties should have a pretty good idea of how implementation
will occur. If they do not, the complaining parties should be able to return
to the panel for assistance.
FALL 1998
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What precedential weight should be accorded panel and Appellate Body decisions? He observed that under the GATT 1947, there were some cases in which
prior panel decisions were not followed, even if the precedent involved the same
parties, same products, and the same issues. He stated that one could argue that
under the GATT 1994, the case for stare decisis is even less compelling. Under
GATT 1947, decisions were adopted by unanimity. That is not how decisions
of the DSB are adopted. Under the current system, there must be unanimity in
order to lock a decision of the DSB.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SUMMARY: Frieder Roessler commented that in the
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body expressly discussed the
issue of the precedential value of its decisions. It rejected the proposition that
prior reports are binding upon subsequent panels. It stated that these reports may
provide guidance, but they are not binding. Richard Elliott agreed. Appellate
Body decisions should get some deference, but not absolute deference.
John Jackson disagreed with Roessler's interpretation of the Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages decision. What the Appellate Body said in that case was that over
time, decisions of the Appellate Body may become "practice," as that term is
used in the Vienna Convention. While there is no true stare decisis that applies
to Appellate Body decisions, and while that doctrine does not apply in civil law
countries, even in civil law countries there is a tendency towards consistency of
decision making by judicial bodies. It certainly is reasonable to look at precedent,
even if that precedent is not absolutely binding. In sum, there is a tendency
towards consistency, even if no one has ever viewed Appellate Body decisions
as having a stare decisis effect.
Jackson added that he agrees with Roessler on the implementation-versuscompensation issue. He noted that a non-implemented report remains on the DSB
agenda. This indicates that implementation is a requirement. Pursuant to article
22.1 of the DSU, as between implementation and other alternatives, implementation is preferred. As among other alternatives, there may be no preference in
the text of the DSU.
Timothy Reif disagreed with Jackson's interpretation of the text of article 22.1.
One could argue that if that is what the drafters intended to say, they could
have specifically stated that full implementation is preferred to compensation or
retaliation. On an issue this central to the WTO's role and authority, only the
clear enunciation of a rule or obligation should be accepted.
Jackson noted that the drafters of the DSU thought that they had conveyed the
point that implementation is preferred, though it might have been better to use
the clearer language employed in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
If the issue eventually comes before the Appellate Body, he predicts that it will
hold that implementation is mandatory and not simply an alternative that the
losing party may choose or reject at its discretion. In practice, most countries
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assume that implementation is required. Further, a regime in which losing countries had a right to choose their remedy would favor large, rich countries over
small, poor countries. Finally, Jackson noted that the United States wants implementation in the cases in which it is victorious.
The question arose as to how a panel might resolve a dispute over tariff bindings
in light of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding. Roessler responded that
a WTO panel does not have the authority to evaluate parties' conduct pursuant
to a bilateral memorandum of understanding. Panels are authorized to evaluate
conduct only in light of the WTO agreements, to the exclusion of bilateral
agreements outside of the WTO.
Roessler's response was questioned as contrary to the position taken by the
United States. The U.S. position has been that since certain bilateral memoranda
of understanding were negotiated during the Uruguay Round, they are part of
the obligations binding upon WTO members pursuant to the WTO agreements.
Roessler said that he would be surprised to learn that the United States in fact
took the position represented by the questioner.
Roessler was further questioned concerning whether a party to a memorandum
of understanding may decline to implement its obligations under that MOU.
Roessler stated that what he was saying was that if a party makes agreements
outside of the WTO context it takes certain risks, because it won't be able to
bring disputes over those agreements to the WTO dispute settlement system.
Parties are better off if they include the results of their negotiations in a tariff
schedule.
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